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CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORIVaTY AS A RULE FOR
THE VALIDITY OF LICENSE TAXES IN KENTUCKY
By WiLLIAMa L. TTIT~ s JR.*
At present there is more than normal concern in this and
other states -with the fiscal problems involved in raising more
revenue to maintain current activities of government and permit
the undertaking of additional services. This need for more
money is urgent at all levels of government although, national
and state revenues are at a new high, for so are expenses, and
even municipalities are expected to finance many expensive
public functions of primarily local interest these days. One way
to relieve the pressure on all budget makers nght be to increase
the rates on, existing taxes, but this method is politically inex-
pedient if not impossible and might be of doubtful effectiveness
in inflationary times.
Another possibility is the imposition of new taxes in an
attempt to reach new sources of revenue, but there are obvious
objections to this alternative also. At least one is how to impose
new taxes and still decrease the competition for a deflated tax
dollar between the various taxing units. This competition already
is pronounced as evidenced by income taxes levied by both the
state and federal governments, by property taxes levied by the
state and city governments, and certain excises imposed by all
three. The integration of competing tax structures is not entirely
a problem of recent development and considerable progress has
been made in recent years toward its solution, but the immediate
need for more revenue certainly accentuates the difficulty
One theoretical way open to the state and city is the greater
use of license taxes for revenue purposes. Many states have
already chosen this path along with other methods in their well
known swing away from the property tax, and most cities are
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, University of
Kentuucky, Lexington; LL.B., University of Kentucky; LL.M.,
University of Michigan.
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the site of a number of taxable businesses. Increased activity m
the method suggested is properly the function of the legislator
or alderman which he must exercise -with advice from the fiscal
adviser or economist, but it would necessarily involve the some-
times difficult problem of devising license tax legislation which
is constitutional and at the same time a reasonably good revenue
producer. This potentially important and always interesting
problem is complicated to some extent in Kentucktn by our
court's insistence that Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution,
the uniformity clause, applies to license taxes.!
Our principal objectives here are to examine the constitu-
tional basis for uniformity of licenses in view of this persistent
assertion by the court, to suggest some of the consequences of
applying the traditional rule of uniformity to this land of tax
by reviewing the more important recent cases, and to call
attention to a few of the implications in the idea, especially
those affecting a modern use of the taxing power.
A discussion of "Excise Taxes and the Uniformity Clause
Sin this Journal some ten years ago touched on certain
phases of this problem, and it is not proposed to cover again
material well investigated before, but in the intervening years
some license tax statutes and ordinances have been before the
court on the question of the uniformity of the tax, and it seems
'Reeves v Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 303 Ky 633, 198 S.W 2d 789
(1947) Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Kentucky Tax Com-
mission, 278 Ky. 367, 128 S.W 2d 581 (1939) Accord: City of Louis-
ville v. Aetna Fire Insurance Co., 284 Ky 154, 143 S.W 2d 948
(1940) City of Danville v. Quaker Maid, Inc., 211 Ky 164, 278 S.W
980 (1925) Commonwealth v Payne Medicine Co., 138 Ky 164, 127
S.W 760 (1910) It should not be supposed on the strength of the
general observations here that the uniformity clause is the only or
main obstacle to the use of license taxes for revenue, particularly by
municipalities. For instance, the city of Louisville is now seeking re-
lief from statutory requirements that revenue from licenses and
excises must go into the sinking fund. See: Editorial, The Louisville
Courier-Journal, February 8, 1948.
-Trimble, Excise Taxes and the Uniformity Clause of the Con-
stitution of Kentucky (1937) 25 Ky. L. J. 342. It will be noted that
Trimble uses the label "excise" while the writer chooses "license"
to describe the type of tax involved. There is little if any difference
in legal result attributable to the choice of terms, and it is thought
the scope of interest here can best be limited by considering only
those cases where the tax in question is called a license. As a matter
of fact, most of the cases cited by Trimble, particularly those on
which his conclusions rest, are license tax cases.
LICENSE TAxES--UNIFORMITY
appropriate to evaluate these cases in light of the fiscal need
already referred to as well as to look again at some of the older
cases. Perhaps a brief discussion of constitutional uniformity
in general will afford sufficient background for the limited
investigation contemplated.
The provisions found in nearly all state constitutions
requiring taxes to be uniform are the principal limitation on a
legislature's exercise of the state's sovereign power to tax.3
Fortunately, the courts have recognized the impossibility of
achieving absolute uniformity in taxation and seldom have
applied the constitutional requirement in its literal sense, but
the broad legal meanings for the concept resulting from judicial
interpretation of the constitutional phrase often are not clear,
consistent or capable of concise statement. It does seem certain
that in the preliminary stages of decision in a case involving the
constitutionality of tax legislation the uniformity of the tax in
the legal sense depends in large measure on what land of tax it
is, and the validity of the legislation more often than not turns
on the court's analysis of the nature of the tax.' After the nature
of the tax is determined its uniformity is dependent primarily
on the validity of the classifications proposed in the statute.!
Thus, if the tax is one on property the constitutional
standard is interpreted or read in one way, if it is an excise
tax, it may be levied in a different manner from a property tax
and still be uniform, and if it is an income tax, or some other
kind of tax not amenable to being forced into the two usual
'See generally* 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed.
1927) Chapter XIV "The Power of Taxation." For an interesting dis-
cussion of the point in a state where there is no uniformity provision
see: State v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 73 Conn. 255, 257, 47 Ati.
299, 300 (1900).
'State Board of Tax Commissioners v Jackson, 283 U. S. 527,
55 Sup. Ct. 540 (1930) Bachrach v Nelson, 349 Ill. 579, 182 N.E. 909
(1932) Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin, 269 Ky. 378, 107 S.W 2d 251
(1937), Knox v. Gulf etc., 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 698 (1926), Gordon,
Uniformity of Taxation in Missoun (1939) 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 242;
Note, Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity in Taxation (1937)
87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 219.
'Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin, 269 Ky. 378, 107 S.W 2d 251
(1937). Cf. Brown, Constitutional Limitations on Progressive Taxa-
tion of Gross Income (1937) 22 IowA L. Rsv. 246, 247, where it is
assumed that the uniformity and equality provisions do not apply if
the income tax is construed not to be a property tax.
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categories, still another criterion for uniformity may apply'
This judicial inclination for categorization m construing state
tax legislation results in part from the wording of the constitu-
tional provisions and in part from the notion that a court's
decision in a tax case must rest on analytical, conceptualistic
reasoning. In any event, it is one of the basic general factors
in the constitutionality of most state tax legislation and should
serve as the starting point for any inquiry into constitutional
uniformity as it relates to a particular kind of tax.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR UNIFORM[ITY OF LICENSE TAXES
As just suggested the basis for applying a rule of uniformity
to license taxes usually is found in the constitution, but it is
not so clear in Kentucky that the idea is the result of exact
constitutional expression for the only mention of uniformity
in the Kentucky Constitution is in that part of Section 171
which reads
"Taxes shall be levied and collected for public pur-
poses only and shall be uniform upon all property of the
same class subject to taxation within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax; and all taxes
shall be levied and collected by general laws."
And the only relevant mention of license taxes is in that
part of Section 181 which reads
"The General Assembly may by general laws only,
provide for the payment of license fees on franchises,
occupations and professions, or a special or excise tax;
8 The practice of referring to all kinds of uniformity provisions as
"the uniformity clause" leads to much confusion. Actually, the
various provisions in the state constitutions differ considerably in
their phraseology scope and effect. Usually the uniformity clause is
any one of three general types: (1) those applicable to property
taxes only because of the wording used in the provision, (2) those
applicable to excise taxes only because of the wording in the pro-
vision or because of judicial interpretation, and (3) those few which
apply to all taxes because of the absence of specific reference in the
provision. Also, any of the three types mentioned by their terms may
require: (a) absolute uniformity, or (b) uniformity within a class.
Normally group (1) includes those provisions which require prop-
erty or ad valorem taxes to be levied according to value. Not only do
the clauses vary as among the various constitutions but a number
of constitutions contain more than one of the types listed. As a result,
it is impossible to think clearly about "uniformity" without keeping
in mind the kind of uniformity provision one is referring to.
'Lowndes, Spurious Conceptions in the Constitutional Law of
Taxation (1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 628, 659.
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There is little on the face of these provisions to preclude
a conclusion that license taxes need not be uniform for the
wording of Section 171 is restricted to property taxes and
Section 181 simply affirms the legislature's power to impose
certain taxes, including licenses, which it unquestionably has
because it is a legislature and not because of any constitutional
authorization. BAt in a consistent line of cases, of which Reeves
v Adam Hat Stores, Inc.,8 is the most recent, the Court of
Appeals has held the constitution requires license taxes to be
uniform within a class.
In the Reeves case the court found an act imposing a license
tax on retail merchants graduated according to the number of
stores owned and operated in the state unconstitutional for want
of uniformity, and m its opinion made this observation.'
"A similar act passed in 1934, as amended in 1936,
was declared to be unconstitutional in Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co. v Kentucky Tax Commission. on
the ground that it was a revenue measure and that the
classification made in the act was not a natural one, but
was unreasonable, and arbitrary and violated sec. 171 of
our Constitution, which provides that taxes shall be
uniform on all property of the same class."
Although the court surely did not mean to imply that a
license tax is a property tax, and therefore might not have
meant exactly what it said, it must be admtted that some
connection between the rule of uniformity in Section 171 and
license taxes is clearly implied. Some of the cases, discussed
more fully nfra and cited supra," assert a direct connection in
this respect. What is this connection and how is it rationalized
with the actual wording of the constitutionQ An answer can
be had only by exploring further the court's expressed ideas
about the basis for uniformity of licenses.
The implication of the Reeves case is more fully explained
in Great Atlantsd and Pacific Tea Co. v Kentucky Tax Com-
m1.ss2on, the most important modern case in point, where the
court points out "
1303 Ky. 633, 198 S.W 2d 789 (1947).
'Id. at 634, 198 S.W 2d at 790 (emphasis added).
"Op. cit., supra, n. 1.
"278 Ky. 367, 378, 128 S.W 2d 581, 587 (1939) (emphasis added).
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"While the provisions of section 171 of our Constitu-
tion requiring taxes to be equal and uniform, may apply
rn their fullness only to direct taxation of property, yet
the principles of equality and uniformity must be ob-
served in imposing license and occupation taxes. The
uniformity provision does not prevent the classification
of businesses, trades, professions or occupations, and the
taxation of different classes at different rates, but the
tax must be uniform on all subjects within the class to
which it is applied, and the classification must be made
according to natural and well recognized lines of dis-
tinction. The principle of equality and uniformity in
taxation is one of the cornerstones of our Constitution
and has been jealously guarded by the decisions of tbis
Court in applying it, not only to statutes levying a direct
tax on property, but to statutes and municipal ordi-
nances imposing occupation taxes."
The position of the court here seems to be that section 171
is the direct source of certain principles of equality and
uniformity which apply to license taxes as well as to property
taxes, and these principles represent a cornerstone of the
constitution which the court must protect. Without taking an
unsympathetic view of the court's conception of the constitution
or its protective role with respect to that document, one may well
wonder what is meant by the phrase "apply m their fullness
only to direct taxation of property," and whether constitutional
cornerstones normally are derived from the precise wording of
a single provision in the fundamental law The position taken
m this regard may very well be the decisive factor m the
validity of the tax, a fact made quite clear in City of Louisville
v Aetna Fire Insurance Co.," where the court distinguished
a potentially controlling Alabama decision on the ground that
the Alabama Constitution did not require uniformity of any
taxes except property taxes.
A search for the underlying reason for the license tax
uniformity rule involves more than a quibble over judicial
language because an understanding of the fundamental basis of
the rule is essential to an accurate evaluation of its utility
Besides, if the rule is based directly on a speeific section of the
constitution, any change or modification in it would have to be
by the laborious process of amendment, but, if the basis is traced
to the court's understanding of the constitution's general theme
regarding taxation, that understanding nght be altered m light
"2 284 Ky 154, 157, 143 S.W 2d 1074, 1076 (1940).
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of present fiscal needs. At least it is interesting to trace the
court's understanding back to a comparatively early case. As
Trimble points out, it was seventeen years after the adoption
of the present constitution before the Court of Appeals was
asked to decide whether the uniformity rule mentioned in
Section 171 applied to the kind of taxes imposed under
authority of Section 181."'
In the Hager case the court held a statute unconstitutional
because the license tax it imposed was not uniform within the
class, but pointed only to the general implications in the
Constitution of 1891 and to a line of historical cases to support
its position that all taxes must be uniform within the class. This
frequently cited opinion is worthy of quotation at some length
for it5 historical significance, for what it shows about the court's
notion of the requirements in Section 171 and other sections of
the constitution regarding fairness in taxation, and for its
intimation that the historical basis for all uniformity is largely
judicial. The court was explicit on thle question of direct
connection between the uniformity rule of Section 171 and taxes
imposed under Section 181. In this respect it said..'
"We do not agree with counsel for appellee that the
direction in section 171 that 'taxes shall be uniform upon
all property subject to taxation within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax' applies directly
or specifically to the license fees mentioned in sec-
tion 181. Yet it is entitled to serious consideration as in-
dicating a purpose that all laws imposing taxes shall
operate in a uniform manner to the end that no favorit-
ism can be shown or discrimination- be practiced."
The opinion clearly recognizes the power of the legislature
to classify license fees (and presumably any tax imposed under
section 181) according to the class of city (constitutionally
defined on the basis of population) and to classify within that
class according to the trade, occupation or business concerned.
But beyond this point taxes imposed under Section 181 must
be uniform within the class. As to this rule the court said ,"
"We do not believe it was contemplated by this sec-
tion (section 181) that the General Assembly might
impose a license fee for State purposes upon blacksmiths
3 Trimble, op. cit., supra n. 2 at 343.
"Hager v Walker, 128 Ky. 1, 107 S.W 254 (1908).
'5Id. at 8, 107 S.W at 256.
'"Id. at 12, 107 S.W at 257.
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in one county and exempt blacksmiths in another,
The authority to impose these special taxes does not
carry with it the right of discrimination and exemption
in any class that is dealt with."
The opinion in the Hager case, however, does more than
establish for taxes imposed under Section 181 a uniform
within the class rule similar to that stated in Section 171 for
property taxes. It indicates a conscious effort on the part of
the court to find the real basis for the rule. Witness the
following rationalization."
"The language, 'The General Assembly may by
general laws only' provide for this species of revenue,
would seem to imply that it was intended that the ap-
plication of the law should be general, operating
equally and alike upon every trade, occupation and pro-
fession that it was designed to reach. If a few, or any
number of persons less than all, who follow a desig-
nated trade, occupation or profession may be exempt,
while the others are taxed, the law imposing the tax
would not be general, but special and local, and for-
bidden by sections 59 and 60 of the Constitution. This
construction is -n harmony with the dominant spirit of
the constitution which provides for uniformity sn almost
.every sub3ect it treats of, "
And in still another place the court asserted
" the power of taxation is, in our judgment,
limited by some of the declared ends and principles of
the fundamental law. Among these political ends and
principles, equality as far as practicable (is) emi-
nently conspicuous An exact equalization of the
burden of taxation is unattainable and Utopian. But still
there are well-defined limits within which the practi-
cal equality of the Constitution may be preserved, and
which therefore, should be deemed impassable barriers
to legislative power. Taxation may not be universal;
but must be general and uniform And although
there may be a discrimination in the subjects of taxa-
tion, still persons in the same class and property of the
same kind must be generally sub3ected alike to the same
common burden."
Finally, the court discussed in detail a number of cases
decided before 1891 under earlier constitutions which were
completely silent on uniformity and concluded."
'7 Ibid. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 15, 107 S.W at 258 (emphasis added)
"Ibzd. The earlier cases cited here were: Schuster v. City of
Louisville, 124 Ky 189, 89 S.W 689 (1904), Simrall v. City of Cov-
ington, 90 Ky 444, 14 S.W 369 (1890), Rankin v. City of Henderson,
9 K.L.R. 861, 7 S.W 174 (1888) Smith v City of Louisville, 9 K.L.R.
779, 6 S.W 911 (1888) Bullit v City of Paducah, 8 K.L.R. 870, 3
S.W 802 (1887)
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"The authorities we have cited arose in cases in-
volving taxation for municipal purposes; but they illus-
trate the rule, that is firmly embodied in the principles
of constitutional law that have always obtained in this
state, that taxation must be uniform and equal as nearly
as it is practicable to make it so, "
In other words, taxes- imposed under authority of Section
181 must be uniform within the class because uniformity is a
general theme of all the sections in the constitution taken
together and not because Section 171 is directly applicable, and
further, the present constitution merely reflects the traditional
principle basic in all taxation that all classes of persons and
property should bear alike the common burden of taxation.
This is indeed a desirable objective for the legislature in its
exercise of the taxing power, and it may be what the court
means to implv in the Reeves case and similar decisions. But
calling the objective what it actually is a judicially recognized
and admittedly general constitutional principle, rather than
what it is not an expressly required constitutional limitation,
will encourage all concerned to see if this particular purpose
of the constitution is being realized in current tax legislation.
It might even lead to some healthy scepticism about the actual
equality and uniformity of burden in taxation which results
from continued use of the traditional rule for uniformity in
license taxation. Such questioning is not warranted, however,
unless predicated on a reasonably accurate estimate of what the
traditional requn:emnent is. What does the court mean by
"uniform within a class" where license taxation is concerned,
and what are some of the consequences of judicial application
of the rule 2
UNIFORIITY OF LICENSE TAXES WITHIN A CLASS
The use of a uniform within the clas concept has not
minimized appreciably the court's problem of determining
whether a particular tax is uniform and equal, but it has
restricted the scope of the court's attention and focused its
emphasis on the validity of the classifications attempted in the
statute. The phraseology used to describe a valid classification
is about the same at this point as it is in the numerous other
instances where courts use the same technique. In order to validly
Law-2
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classify in a license tax statute the legislature must choose some
"reasonable," "distinctive," or "natural" basis for the classi-
fication so the discrimination practiced is not "arbitrary "
"unreasonable," or "capricious." ' In fact, the descriptive
labeling of classes is so standardized that the words in and of
themselves mean very little. The really decisive factors in the
classifieafion process are those essentially distinctive features of
a tax tlass which the court has upheld in the past and should
sustain as permissible again. The Court of Appeals has singled
out a number of distinctions between classes which it considers
controlling. Many of these are not too well defined and others
are more applicable to classifications in statutes other than
those imposing a license tax. Some are applicable here.
Nearly fifty years ago, in Gordoiz v City of Loitisville."
the court suggested at least three principles of classification in
license tax legislation which it would recognize, and Trimble
confirms their continued use until 1937 2 For our purpose they
may be stated as follows (1) a license tax can be imposed
upon all persons engaged in the same business without regard
to the volume of business done, or (2) on a business according
to the amount of business done without the rate of the tax
changing as the volume of business changes, or (3) by dividing
a general class into separate classes according to the volume of
business done with the rate increasing with the volume of
business. A brief chronological resume of the more important
recent cases will show how these principles have been followed
to the present time and indicate other influential factors in a
valid classification.
In the companion cases of Davis v PelfreyzI and Johnvson
v City of Paducah,2 the court made a clear distinction between
an annual $5.00 license tax on non-resident users of automobiles
and an identical tax on resident and non-resident users, where
"'Madden v Commonwealth, 309 U.S. 83 (1939) affirming 277
Ky 343, 126 S.W 2d 463 (1939), Martin v. Gage, 281 Ky. 95, 134
S.W 2d 966 (1939) Williams v City of Bowling Green, 254 Ky 11,
70 S.W 2d 967 (1937).
21 138 Ky 442, 446, 128 S.W 367, 368 (1910)
See Trimble, op. cit., supra n. 2 at 346 for a thorough discus-
sion of these principles and the cases pertaining to each.
'285 Ky 298, 147 S.W 2d 723 (1941)
2'285 Ky 294, 147 S.W 2d 721 (1941).
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both ordinances were designed to reach vehicles used in "any
kind or character of business, work, pr<ofession, occupation or
calling within the corporate limits of the city " In the Johnson
case the court thought there was a reasonable distinction
between non-residents who were treated like residents and other
non-residents in that the former used the city streets and
contributed to the parking and traffic problem, but in the Davis
case it found non-residents were treated differently from res-
idents. The court suggested that had there been a separate
ordinance imposing a similar tax on residents in th.e Davis
case the ordinance in question would have been valid. This seems
to be another way of saving there not only must be uniformity
within a class, but there must be equality between classes.
Actually, there is about as much reason for classifying on the
basis of resident and non-resident users as there is for classifying
either of those classes on the basis of who parks his automobile
or contributes to traffic congestion. Th.e really significant point,
however, is that precise application of any uniformity rule is
apt to lead to some mildly ridiculous result. Drawing a fine line
between classes simply determines their validity, it doesn't
alter their similarity Perhaps the constitutional requirement
should serve as a sign of general direction for exercise of the
taxing power, rather than as an inflexible rule always available
for restricting that power.
In Denton v Potter,' the court had before it the problem
of determining the validity of sub-classes within the same general
occupation. There, the so-called "Peddler's Act" of 1940 was
successfully attacked on the ground that the license tax imposed
was not uniform on all persons in the same class. The statute
provided for three groups of peddlers (1) those who traveled
on foot, (2) those with a vehicle, and (3) those who sold their
goods from any vehicles, booth, tent, roadside or temporary
stand. Payment of a $25.00 annual tax was required of the
second group, but oiily a fee of $1.00 for the license was required
of the other two groups. The court found this feature lacking
in uniformity and a fatal defect to the validity of the statute.
It conceded the power of the legislature to sub-classify peddlers
on th.e basis attempted, but it felt the failure to impose any tax
- 284 Ky. 114, 143 S.W 2d 1056 (1940)
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on two of the three sub-classes indicated unreasonable dis-
crimination. It suggested the legislature might impose graduated
rates on the sub-classes since the basis of distinction might bear
some relation to the differences in the amount of business "that
in all reasonable probability would be conducted by the persons
in these classifications." '
There is a difference it seems between sub-classification for
the purpose of graduating a tax, and sub-classifying to impose
one because the former mav reflect a difference in the amount of
business done. This interpretation is not an iniovation because
it is a necessary consequence of one of the principles suggested
at the outset in this part of the discussion, but it certainly puts
one to thinking about the "well-defined limits within which the
practical equality of the Constitution may be preserved, and
which, therefore, should be deemed impassable barriers to
legislative power." ' Again, the difficulty may not be with the
rule, but with the use of a broad constitutional concept as a rule.
In City of Louzsville v Aetna Fire Insurance Co., 28 the
court considered the validity of a Firemen's Pension Fund tax
on fire insurance policies written on property located in the
city at a rate of two per cent of the gross premiums. The
ordinance levying the tax was contested on several grounds, one
of them being absence of uniformity and equality in violation
of Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The ordinance was
found wanting iii uniformity and unconstitutional because those
persons who insured their property paid the tax and those who
did not insure paid nothing. The court reasoned that. the duty
of a municipal fire department is the same toward all com-
bustible property in the city and while it owes no greater duty
toward property insured than it does in respect to property not
insured the burden of the tax would eventually fall ol the
owners of insured property
The court did not elaborate on the non-uniform feature
except to refer to cases from other jurisdictions holding similar
Id. at 118, 143 S.W 2d at 1058.
Hager v Walker, 128 Ky. 1, 15, 107 S.W 254, 258 (1908).
S284 Ky. 154, 143 S.W 2d 1074 (1940).
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acts void for lack of uniformity and equality ' A close reading
of the cases referred to reveals little explanation why the court
did not consider whether fire insurance companies were a valid
class, or whether insurers of property were a distinctive group
who would bear the burden of the tax equally and uniformly
as between themselves. The court did consider appellant's
argument that the Firemen's Pension Fund accomplished a
public service and conceded it would tend toward betterment
of fire service, but found the worthiness of the plan could not
overcome the objectionable lack of uniformity because "taxes
should be levied and collected in strict accord with constitutional
provisions and arguments of convenience should not be permitted
to override the constitution." '
In Hartmann v City of Lozdsville,' a "wholesale fruit and
vegetable" ordinance imposing a license fee graduated on the
basis of established and non-established dealers was resisted on
the usual grounds that the classification attempted was "capri-
cious, arbitrary, discriminatory and not founded upon any
natural or reasonable distinction." The court adopted as its
-opinion the finding of a Special Judge below who had relied
directly on the statement of an agent from the Department of
Agriculture of the University of Kentucky as to the reasonable-
ness of the classification between established and non-established
dealers. The Special Judge did cite with approval a statement
by the court in an earlier case to the effect that, "A classification
adopted by a Legislature in imposing occupation taxes will be
held constitutional if there are substantial differences between
the occupations separately classified, and such differences need
not be great." ' The ordinance was upheld, but in view of the
nature of the opinion it is uncertain whether the court would
"San Francisco v Liverpool etc., 74 Cal. 113, 15 Pac. 380 (1887)
State-v. Merchants Ins. Co., 12 La. Ann. 802, 26 La. 661 (1857) Lowry
v. City of Clarksdale, 154 Miss. 155, 122 So. 195 (1929) Continental
Insurance Co. v Simrah, 131 Neb. 791, 270 N.W 122 (1936) Phila-
delphia Ass'n. for Relief of Disabled Firemen v Wood, 39 Pa. 73
(1909), Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v Jones, 78 S.C. 445, 59 S.E. 148 (1907)
American Alliance v. Board of Insurance Commissioners, 126 S.W
2d 741, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) Com. v National Fire Ins. Co.; 161 Va.
-737, 172 S.E. 448 (1934)
Op. cit., supra, n. 28 at 158, 143 S.W 2d at 1076.
" 282 Ky. 487, 138 S.W 2d 948 (1940).
' Id. at 490, 138 S.W 2d at 950.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
consistently recognize the validity of a classification based
primarily on the established character of a business as testified
to by an expert witness. It is a possibility
In Commissioners of Sinking Fund of Louisville v 11'es,3
still another question in sub-classification was decided. There
the city imposed a license tax on "every person, firm or cor
poration engaged in the business of selling furniture, household
goods, or wearing apparel, on a strictly installment plan and
operating a regular installment business." Counsel for both
litigants and the court agreed the city could classify and sub-
classify trades, occupations, and professions for the purpose
of licensing them, and that persons engaged in the same business
could be classified and a different license tax imposed on each
class if the differences between classes "spring from a reasonable
basis in the nature of things", but there agreement ended. The
city thought conducting a regular installment business con-
stituted a particular method of doing business because the risk
of extending credit required the charging of a higher price and
that the right of repossession of the goods upon default in
payment of an installment made a difference. In addition, the
selling of furniture, household goods or wearing apparel, which
are necessities of life, justified a special or higher tax than where
the sale was of commodities not deemed to be necessaries. The
taxpayer was convinced the last mentioned part of the classifica-
tion was arbitrary, discriminatory, not uniform and invalid. In
sustaining the taxpayer's position, the court recognized full
understanding by both parties of the rules involved, acknowl-
edged that the difficulty lay in application of the rules, and
said
"It seems to us that the singling out of the business
of selling necessities for special licensing savors of in-
equity rather than reason. But the controlling factor in
the 3udicial determination of validity is that of logical
considerations of uniformity and equality."
Then the court spelled out its "logical considerations"
regarding the particular tax as follows '
"Here is a classification of business according to the
methods of operation-as between the method of ordi-
S269 Ky. 554, 108 S.W 2d 515 (1937)
"Id. at 557, 108 S.W 2d at 517 (emphasis added).
Ibid.
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nary merchants and the installment plan. Then those
following the latter plan are divided between those mer-
chants who handle everything but household furnish-
ing and wearing apparel and those who sell those neces-
sities. The first class are exempt. The second, limited
class, are taxed. The appellees point out that no dealers
in any other kind of merchandise than furniture or
clothing, either in the ordinary or customary manner of
cash and credit sales or on the installment plan, are sub-
ject to the tax. Illustrative of the injustice and absence
of uniformity and reasonableness, a merchant whose
major receipts are from the installment sales of jewelry,
bicycles, and other things, and not having to pay the
license, may be in business next door to a merchant
selling furniture on the same plan who would have to
pay it. On the other side of. him may be a merchant who
sells furniture for cash and credit and on installments,
but who would not have to pay such tax because less
than half of his receipts are in installments."
Except for the description of the classes, which could be
obtained from reading the ordinance, the above quoted explana-
tion gives little help to one seeking a working solution for the
problems of uniformity within a class. The court seems to have
been impressed by the possible inequality between classes, as
suggested before, rather than by any real differences between
persons m the same class which is the really troublesome problem
in applying a uniform within the class rule. The court did
recogize rather clearly that constitutional uniformity in the
final analysis is something that is subject to judicial determina-
tion based on "logical considerations." Consciously, or otherwise,
the court broke away from the traditional belief that the
uniformity provision can be applied to a particular license tax,
or any tax for that matter, as if it were a well-defined meehaieal
rule capable of being consti'ued according to pre-conceived ideas
divorced from the exigencies of current needs and problems.
Probably the most influential case of the past ten years on
this problem is Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v Kentucky
Tax Conmission,' already mentioned in another connection.
Here the court was asked to determine the validity of the 1934
Chain Store Tax, as amended in 1936. The statute imposed a tax
on retail stores graduated according to the number of stores in
the state. The A. & P_ Company, owners and operators of two
hundred stores, contested the constitutionality of the statute on
the theory, tnter alia, that it violated Section 171 of the Kentucky
" 278 Ky. 367, 128 S.W 2d 581 (1939).
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Constitution. By way of showing lack of uniformity it contended
the Kroger Grocery and Baking Company was the only other
merchant owing and operating more than fifty stores in the
state (which was the maximum bracket in the statute) , that
there were other merchants in the state having larger gross
sales, gToss receipts, net receipts and net income, and that both
it and Kroger were operating with an annual net loss. The court
summarized the points of difference between the owner of
multiple units and the owner of a single store which the state
urged in support of the -validity of the tax as follows
abundant capital, superior management, lower
operating costs, greater efficiency in purchasing, buying
for cash and thereby obtaining cash discounts, ware-
housing of goods and distributing same from a single
warehouse to numerous stores, and cheaper advertis-
ing. "
After an extended discussion of authorities, and at least
some reference to all the questions presented,' the court found
the statute unconstitutional for lack of uniformity in that there
was not a reasonable basis for classification according to the
uniber of stores owned and operated in the state.
The opinion in the A. & P case is full of decisive, and,
perhaps, questionable assertions about the law governing the
statute in question, but our attention at this point is directed
only to those pertaining to distinctive features in a -valid classi-
fication. First, the court reviewed many of the distinctions it
h.ad upheld and denied in the past. including the three principles
first asserted in the Gordon case, and then called attention to
the fact "that the license taxes imposed by the statute under
consideration bear no relation to the volumne of busivess done,
but are arbitrarily fixed in accordance with the 9iurnber of stores
operated by a single owner." Of course, the state had admitted
• Id. at 379, 128 S.W 2d at 587.
:" One of these was the related problem which runs through all
these cases as to whether the uniformity clause applies to a license
tax imposed as an exercise of the police power rather than the taxing
power. The older cases are not entirely clear on this point, but Trim-
ble and others suggest that uniformity does apply to a regulatory tax,
and there is support for this conclusion in the instant case. There
really is little difference between the basis for uniformity in regu-
latory licenses and its basis as it is being considered here, but in the
cases discussed above the tax was held to be a revenue measure or
its validity was litigated on that theory
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this and was resting its contention on the distinctive character
of the number of stores feature, so the court had to make the
following analyss 
"These same points of difference (those urged by
appellee) appear between the owners of independent
units. One owner has an abundant supply of capital;
another a limited supply. One buys for cash and obtains
cash discounts; another buys on credit. One is skillful
In buying; another is unskillful. One operates his busi-
ness on the cash and carry plan, while another extends
credit and maintains a delivery service. Innumerable
other points of difference could be pointed out. No two
merchants conduct their business on exactly the same
Dlan. It is obvious that the differences relied on as a
basis for the classification are not peculiar to a group of
stores under unified management or ownership. Skill-
fullness in buying and efficiency in management are
personal attributes, regardless of whether the merchant
owns one or more stores. Likewise the quantity of capi-
tal employed and the advantages flowing therefrom are
not dependent upon the number of stores owned and
operated. They arise from the size of the business and
not from the number of stores. A classification of a
business, based on a difference in number only is with-
out substance and does not have a reasonable relation
,o the object of the taxing act, which is to raise
"evenue."
The final thought in the explanation given would seem to be
the critical implication in this case. The court does not categori-
cal]v read out of the classifying technique the element of size
as reflected by number of stores, but it does suggest that size
and taxation for revenue are not sufficiently related to make the
statute constitutional.
The decision on the particular point is as good an illustra-
tion as one will find of how constitutional uniformity is used to
stop the taxing power at some particular point. In fact, it might
well serve as a leading ease on the role of the judiciary under
the constitution as it has been conceived of in this country since
the beginning of the last century The only troublesome thing
is that the courts seldom if ever give any direct indication that
they realize what is going on and wh.at they are doing. All their
explanations and rationalizations and reasons are made in
terms of applying narrow, specific constitutional rules in an
unimaginative and coldly analytical manner. Both their attitude
Op. cit., supra, n. 36 at 380, 128 S.W 2d at 587 (emphasis
added).
KENTUCKY LAV JOURNAL
and techmque leave one with the impression that little con-
sideration is given to the numerous other factors involved.
Occasionallv, some opinion or dissent pierces the veil which
surrounds constitutional interpretation in this kind of tax cases
and suggests things which should influence the court other than
the application of the nice, precise rule. The dissent in the
A. & P case does this and should be noticed particularly
Witness the following °
"While I realize that the method of classification
employed in the so-called chain store tax in question is
not the best to be had, it does not seem to me to be an
arbitrary classification for license tax purposes. A sound
tax measure should have some definite relation to the
:ncome of the taxpayer, since taxes are paid from in-
come or capital. But in all such matters the legislature
has been given wide latitude in determining the sub-
jects to be taxed and the mahner in which the taxes are
to be applied.
Progress has been made in recent years in the field
of taxation toward the goal of levying and collecting
taxes in accordance with the ability of the taxpayer to
nay Property taxes, which are as old as organized gov-
ernment, and which have long" been condemned, have
been giving way rapidly to the more modern types of
business, income and excise taxes, of which the measure
in question is one. This change, however, has not kept
pace with the rapid changes in our social and economic
structure which incidentally accounts in no small part
for the confusion and chaos in the field of taxation. Ken-
tucky has been in the forefront in attempting to adopt a
more equitable tax structure, though she still has some
way to go along the road."
By way of summarizing this brief look at th.e basis for
uniformity of licenses and the more important recent cases, it
is suggested that the decisions of the court taken as a whole
have within them the ingredients for a different and useful way
of thinking about constitutional uniformity In the first place,
the opinions in these cases contain more than a hint that
uniformity in this instance is a broad, general objective of the
constitution rather than a narrow, specific limitation. Secondly,
they suggest that application of the usual uniform within a class
rule actually amounts to a judicial evaluation of the distinctive
differences in classification which rest in part on clear principles,
but necessarily include certain logical considerations of the
court. Finally, when these two ideas are combined, it is apparent
Id. at 382, 128 S.W 2d at 589.
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that the usual difficulty in achieving uniformity is not caused
by the application of the rule to a particular statute but by the
use of a general constitutional objective as a rule for the validity
of any tax. If the legislature and the court were to so rationalize
constitutional uniformity, what would be the effect on the
exercise of the taxing power and the rights or interests of the
persons and businesses on whom that power worksl Some
limited speculation and comparison in this respect, as a final
phase of this discussion, may be helpful.
SOMNE IMPLICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
A better orientation of the taxing power is one implication
in the suggested idea of treating constitutional uniformity as a
general objective rather than a limiting rule. This orientation
is usually described as fairness in taxation, which the courts
take to mean an equality of burden or an equality in bearing
the expense of government.' If the legislature and court were
to recognize uniformity a. a goal of fairness toward which the
taxing power is directed, more attention could be given to the
possible methods available for achieving equality of burden.
The traditional way of looking at the constitutional requirement
has resulted in an approximate equality only, and the approxi-
mation is determined from the viewpoint of the particular
taxpayer who questions the validity of the tax. Its use affords
little opportunity to consider the over all effect of the tax on
the public in relation to other essential factors, such as the
place of the tax in the entire tax structure.
In imposing a license tax, for instance, the legislature
should consider carefully whether the owners of certain busi-
nesses should bear their share of the total burden of taxation
equally as between themselves merely as owners, or as owners
of a particular kind of business, or as owners of a particular
kind of business of a certain size operated in a certain way
This is something that should be given as much direct attention
as possible before the tax is imposed rather than left to a belated
and often extended determination by the courts. Of course, a
" Pierce v. State, 229 Iowa 170, 294 N.W 237 (1940) Walker v.
City of Richmond, 173 Ky. 26, 189 S.W 1122 (1916), Huron-Clinton,
etc. v. Board of Supervisors, 304 Mich. 328, 8 N.W 2d 84 (1943),
Com. v. Repplier Coal Co., 348 Pa. 372, 35 A. 2d 319 (1944).
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court or a legislature may consider the question of fairness of
burden in the application of the uniformity provisions as a rule,
but the emphasis is different. The rule method tends to confuse
the true issue rather than clarify it by directing the court's
attention unnecessarily to the mechanical details of application.
The affirmative approach to uniformity helps one keep clearly
in mind that broad equality of burden is the ultimate end of all
taxation. With this basic thought as a guide one can make a
more rational decision as to whether equality of burden is more
closely related to ability to pay than to the value of that which
is owned, or whether it is more closely connected to the volume
of business done rather than the number of stores owned m
the state. The choice of bases for distributing fairly the burdens
of taxation is a matter of policy and constitutional uniformity
should be the criterion in the fundamental law toward which
the policy makers move, rather than a technical "rule-like"
barrier through which thev break at their own risk.
Another implication- is that an affirmative and generar
objective usually is more flexible than a rule, and constitutional
uniformity used in the proposed way would allow the legislature
or court to revise and revalue periodically their ideas about the
best way to accomplish equality of burden in taxation. The
whole economic life of any modern community, be it local, state
or national, changes rapidly, especially those essentially eco-
nomic factors which determine who is best able to carry any
given share of the costs of government at any given time. One
only needs to look about hin to confirm this fact, and, as
previously suggested, the cost of government itself changes
from time to time so that the amount of burden to be borne
equally is never the same. If the particular constitutional
standard for taxation-in this instance the one applicable to
license taxes-is thought of and applied as a rule, there is an
almost irresistible tendency on the part of all concerned to treat
the standard as fixed and unchangeable. This is a fatal charac
teristie of all rules, and while one may disavow the tendency
on us part, he still will rely on Hager v Walker, or the Gordon
case in determining the constitutionality of a modern chain
store tax. The best way to make a constitutional provision
flexible, changeable, usable and a fair standard against which
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to measure the validity of modern tax legislation is to remove
from it as many of its rule" characteristics as possible.
Except for a natural hesitancy about giving up traditional
notions, the two major objections to the general thesis suggested
here probably would be (1) that the legislature already has
too much discretion in determininz the equality of burden in
taxation and this method would only increase that discretion,
and (2) that the only effective restraint on the taxing power
of the state would be reduced materially Both of these possible
objections are sufficiently important to warrant brief analysis
here.
Most of the fears implicit in the first objection can be
dispelled by additional reflection on the nature of the idea in
question. Using uniformity as an objective rather than a rule
requires only a change in technique and does not contemplate
any shift in responsibility or discretion. The amount or degree
of discretion in the legislature would be no more and no less
than it now has in tax legislation, or any other legislation for
that matter. The legislature would continue to initiate the
particular tax, but it would so devise the legislation as to bring
about over-all uniformity and equality of burden in the entire
tax structure in view of modern economic conditions. The court
would retain all of its traditional prerogatives over legislative
action. It would still be the judge of whether the tax statute
is compatible with the constitution, and have the final say as to
whether the taxing power is being used to impose a tax in the
fashion contemplated by the fundamental law It would continue
to be the guardian of the constitution in the sense that it could
determine without legislative or popular interference whether
the general objectives of the constitution in this particular
respect were being met. Its power would not be encroached
upon in any conceivable way All the idea involves, really, is
that both the legislature and the court would become more aware
of something they are already doing to some extent. That is,
they would shift their attention and emphasis to the constitu-
tional standard directly and use it so as to minimize some of
the confusion which results from trying to fit a constitutionally
expressed generality to the particulars of a given tax statute
as it affects the special problem of one taxpayer. The relation
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of the legislature and the court to each other regarding the
present discretion of either would not be altered by such a shift.
The second objection is more valid and inevitably leads one
into a comparison of the state constitutional requirement for
uniformtv with the federal constitutional requirement for equal
protection of the laws. A number of courts in recent years have
concluded there is little if any difference between the effect
of a state constitutional provision requiring uniformity within
the class on the state taxing power and the effect of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Without
taking the time or space to fully consider the accuracy ar
implications of such a conclusion, it is possible to point to a
Kentucky decision which is helpful in putting the instant
objection in proper perspective. In Reynolds Metal Company v
Martzm," a specially appointed court considered and sustained
the constitutionality of the income tax in this state. Although
the critical aspect of the case as presented pertained to the
nature of an income tax, the meaning of uniformity within
a class was considered and much of the pertinent authority as
to what is a valid classification under the state constitution as
compared with the federal constitution was reviewed. The
Reynolds case removes all doubt that "The standards for
classification under our State Constitution are th.e same as those
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion." " If this categorical statement can be taken at its face
value, any fears about unrestrained taxing power as a result of
the suggestions made above are not too inportant because the
s,tate, through its legislature, would still be limited in the
imposition of a tax by the equal protection clause. This fact
suggests the final observation that the only function, as well as
the best purpose, of constitutional uniformitv may be to serve
as the general objective for any exercise of the taxing power
"State, etc. v City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409
(1933) State v Mirabal, 33 N.M. 553, 273 Pac. 928 (1928) Ex Parte
Shaw, 53 Okla. 654, 157 Pac. 900 (1916) State ex rel Davis Smith
Co. v Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101 (1911).
"269 Ky 378, 107 S.W 2d 251 (1937).
"Id. at 395, 107 S.W 2d at 260.
